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NEW DECISIONS ON TAXATION IN INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
The problem of the adjustment of the mutual powers and
duties of the national government and of the states is an everpresent one in our legal system, and in no subject is this problem
more difficult or more pressing than that of taxation. With all
the numerous decisions of the Supreme Court on this subject (or
perhaps because these decisions are so numerous) the matter
is still doubtful and confused. Two recent decisions of the court
have, however, cast some light upon this darkness. These cases
are Willcuts v. Bunn1 and Educational Films Corporation of
America v. Ward.2
The first of these decisions is to the effect that profit realized
on the sale of state and municipal securities is taxable as income
by the Federal government. The latter case sustains a New
York franchise tax based upon corporate income, as applied to
a domestic corporation, a large part of whose income was realized from copyrights granted by the Federal government. The
cases are, therefore, alike in that intergovernmental relations
are concerned and that in both instances a tax was sustained
notwithstanding a claim that the tax burdened some function of
the other government.
It is well understood, of course, that the states may not by
taxation or otherwise substantially burden the functions of the
Federal government, and that the Federal government is similarly required not to burden the functions of the state.3 It is the
problem of drawing the line between permitted and forbidden
taxes, which causes the trouble.
While the states are forbidden to impose an undue burden
upon interstate commerce 4 yet considerable leeway is given, and
state taxes which actually burden such commerce may yet be sustained if the burden is not regarded as unreasonable. 5 Thus a
1 51 Sup. Ct. 125 (Jan. 5, 1931).

2 51 Sup. Ct. 170 (Jan. 12, 1931).
3 MoCullooh v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 316 (1819).
4 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1 (1910).
5 Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 142 U. S. 217 (1891). But see Galveston etc. Ry. Co. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217 (1908).
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state may impose a tax upon the net income of a corporation
even though such a corporation secures substantially all its
income from interstate commerce. 6 But these interstate commerce problems are not applicable with respect to intergovernmental relations, since interstate commerce is not a function of
7
the Federal government but is merely under its protection.
Accordingly, where a function of the Federal government is
burdened by a state tax, or a state government is burdened by a
Federal tax, the courts may be, and in fact are, more rigid in
their requirements. Thus state taxes which in any way burden
the Indians, whom the Federal government has the duty to protect, are regarded with much hostility by the Supreme Court.8 It
is also well settled that neither government may tax the officers
or employees of the other with respect to their emoluments of
office. 9 And quite naturally, the borrowing power-that sine qua
non of any government-is protected most carefully as against
a state tax burdening the securities of the Federal government,
or vice versa.' 0 Other necessary governmental functions are
similarly protected even against non-discriminatory taxes. 11 For
example, the Supreme Court has held that a state may not impose an excise tax upon gasoline sold to the United States for
use by the Coast Guard, even though this tax was collected from
all other users of gasoline. 12 So far has this protection been
carried that it is held that a deduction permitted in computing
the tax may not be diminished in any way by reason of income
from the securities issued by the other government, and thus not
directly taxable, upon the ground that this results in a tax burden upon such securities. 13
6 U. S. Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321 (1918). See also Peck &
Co. v. Lowe, 247 U. S. 165 (1918).
7 Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501 (1922).
8 See Brown, The Taxation of Indian Property, 15 Minn. L. R. 182
(1931).
9 Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. (U. S.) 113 (1871); Dobbins v. Erie County,
16 Pet. (U. S.) 435 (1842).
10 Weston v. Charleston,2 Pet. (U. S.) 449 (1829); Bank of Commerce
v. New York, 2 Black (U. S.) 620 (1862); Bank Tax Case, 2 Wall. (U. S.)
200 (1864); United States v. Railroad Co., 17 Wall. (U. S.) 322 (1872).
11 Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460 (1881); Williams v. Talladega,
206 U. S. 404 (1912); FederalLand Bank v. Crosland,261 U. S. 374 (1923).
12 Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U. S. 218 (1928).
13 Miller v. Milwaukee, 272 U. S. 713 (1927); National Life Insurance
Co. v. United States, 277 U. S. 508 (1928); Missouri v. Gehner, 281 U. S.
313 (1930).
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There is thus considerable authority that no tax burden may
be imposed by the states upon Federal securities or other functions of the national government, and that state securities and
functions are similarly immune from the burden of Federal
taxation. In fact, however, the United States Supreme Court
has not been able to adhere to this rigid rule. In several classes
of cases a certain amount of encroachment by the one government upon the other, even in this field of intergovernmental relations, has been permitted.
Two conspicuous and undoubted examples of such permitted
encroachments are the inheritance tax cases and the "stock of
stockholders" cases. In the former class of cases it is held that
the United States may tax a bequest to the state, or a state may
tax one to the United States ;14 furthermore that either government may impose an inheritance tax notwithstanding the fact
that the estate consists wholly or in part of securities issued by
the other government, which securities could not, of course, be
taxed directly.' 5 The other class of cases mentioned above holds
that in taxing corporate stock in the hands of the stockholders
no allowance need be made for the fact that the corporation is
the owner of securities which are directly non-taxable on the
principles already discussed.1
However, if the tax is levied
against the corporation rather than against its stockholders allowance must be made for the non-taxable securities, notwithstanding the fact that the ultimate economic burden is the same
whether the corporation itself or the stockholders are taxed. 17
A third example of such permitted encroachments is in connection with governmental agents. Even an undoubted agent of
the United States may ordinarily be taxed by the state upon its
property, notwithstanding that the property has been obtained
from the United States.' 8 And it is now definitely laid down
that an independent contractor with a state is not immune from
Federal taxation on the amount received from the state, even
14 United States v. Perkins, 163 U. S. 625 (1896); Snyder v. Bettman,
190 U. S. 249 (1903).
15 Plummer v. Coler, 178 U. S. 115 (1900); Greiner v. Lewellyn, 258 U.
S. 348 (1922); Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. 1 (1928).
16 Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. (U. S.) 573 (1865); Des Moines Bank
v. Fairweather,263 U. S. 103 (1923).
17 Home Savings Bank v. Des Moines, 205 U. S. 503 (1907).
18 Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. (U. S.) 5 (1873); California v.
Central Pacific Ry. Co., 127 U. S. 1 (1888); Baltimore Co. v. Baltimore, 195
U. S. 375 (1904).
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though his services were performed in an essential governmental
function of that state. 19
The remaining class of cases is the most important but also
the most dubious. This relates to state or national taxes upon
the franchise of corporations which are the holders of securities
issued by the other government. It is obvious that such a tax is,
or may be, a burden upon the government which issued the securities; yet it has been held that such a tax may be computed
upon the basis of the entire stock of a corporation a large pro20
portion of whose capital is invested in United States bonds.
The same rule has been, expressly laid down by the court in Flint
v. Stone Tracy Company,2 ' with respect to a Federal tax upon
corporations based upon their net income, which income included
interest upon state and municipal bonds. The tax was sustained
on the basis that it was leviedupon the corporation, and the burden upon the state and municipal corporations was entirely
fortuitous and incidental.
These cases were decided when the Supreme Court had the
idea that a state had plenary power to admit or exclude corporations on any terms deemed desirable. With the abandonment of
this idea in recent years there has come to be a change of view
as to the propriety of such franchise taxes. This change shows
clearly in Indian Oil Co. v. Oklahoma,22 where it was held that a
state might not tax a Federal lease of Indian lands directly, or
eveli indirectly by taxing the stock of the lessee corporation upon
a valuation including the value of the lease. It became still more
explicit in Northwestern Insurance Co. v. Wisconsin,23 where
the court unanimously held that a state tax upon insurance companies of three per cent of their gross income is invalid so far as
such income is derived from United States bonds held by the corporation. And if after this decision the idea that a corporate
franchise tax could be levied with reference to non-taxable securities still survived, the death blow to it would seem to have
24
been given by Macallen Company v. Massachusetts.
10 Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514 (1926); Wheeler Co. 'U.
United States, 281 U. S. 572 (1930).
20 The leading case is Home Insurance Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 594
(1889), but there are several earlier cases to the same effect.
21220 U.S. 107 (1911).
22 240 U.S. 522 (1916).
23 275 U.S. 136 (1927).
24 279 U. S. 620 (1929).
See Powell, The Macallen Case-and Before,
8 Nat. Income Tax Mag. 47 (1930); Powell, The Macallen Case-and Be-
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The last case held unconstitutional a Massachusetts excise
tax based on corporate income, insofar as such income was composed of interest from bonds of the United States or its governmental agencies. The court took the position that such an interest was a direct burden upon the United States bonds held by
the tax-paying corporation even though the basis of the tax was
the privilege of being a corporation-a privilege given and certainly within the taxing jurisdiction of Massachusetts. It was
also suggested that the Massachusetts legislature had acted with
the dishonest intent of taxing such securities, in view of the fact
that the law as originally enacted did not include interest from
Federal securities in the taxable income and had been amended
so as to bring about such inclusion. This theory is apparently
not to be taken seriously since it would result in the ridiculous
situation that a state may tax Federal securities only if it does
so without showing a definite intent to that effect; furthermore
the power of each state to levy such a tax would be determined
according to its own history and without regard to the situation
of other states. It is clear, therefore, that the Macallen case is
on any reasonable construction a direct authority that a state
may not levy a corporate franchise tax burdening even indirectly
any Federal securities. The power of making indirect encroachments, at least of this kind, was supposedly ended.
Even under these authorities the decision in Willcuts v.
Bun7 25 presented no real difficulty, and the court was unanimous.
It is, of course, entirely settled that profits on the sale of capital
assets may be included in taxable income,2 6 so that the only
possible objection to the tax would be that it was an indirect
burden upon the state securities. 27 Certainly there is no direct
burden, and it is not clear that there is any indirect burden in
view of the fact that this income does not come from the issuer
of the bond as is the case with interest and, unlike the case of
interest, both the income and the tax are non-recurrent. Furthermore it does not appear that such an immunity from Federal
tax as claimed in this case would assist states and municipalities
yond, 8 Nat. Income Tax Mag. 91 (1930); Brown, Restrictions on State Taxation Because of Interference with Federal Functions, 17 Va. L. Rev. 325
(1931).
25 Supra, note 1.
2
6 Merchants' Loan and Trust Co. -v. Smietanka, 255 U. S. 489 (1921).
27 That the federal government cannot tax the income from state and
municipal securities appears from Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co.,
157 U. S. 429, 583-586; 158 U. S. 601, 618.
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in marketing their bonds, since the immunity from tax on profits
would logically and sensibly mean a denial of deductions for
losses. Furthermore, as the court pointed out, the long continued practice has been to include such profits in taxable incomes,
and this without protest from the states. Thus the court had no
real difficulty and the result was obviously correct.
Not so easy, however, was the task of the writer of the opinion in EducationalFilm Corporationof America v. Ward.28 This
writer was Mr. Justice Stone, one of the dissenters in Macallen
v. Massachusetts,29 whereas here the dissenting opinion was
written by Mr. Justice Sutherland who wrote the opinion of the
court in the Macallen case. But one hardly needs this information in order to realize that the Macallen case was the chief intellectual hurdle for the court.
The opinion concedes that copyrights are Federal instrumentalities, 30 and goes into a lengthy discussion of whether the New
York tax was a franchise tax or an income tax. The dissenting
opinion takes what seems to be the correct view, namely that it
is a franchise tax measured by income.3' But, at any rate, the
discussion is largely verbal fencing with shadows, since Macallen Company v. Massachusetts32 clearly holds that a franchise
tax indirectly burdening the Federal borrowing power by using
income from non-taxable securities as a measure of the tax, can
not be sustained 3 The court further takes great comfort in
Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 34 but that case was certainly overruled
on this point by the Macallen case, unless on the theory that the
Federal government has greater rights to hamper the states
than the states have to hamper the Federal government-a
position which is perhaps not without some reasonable basis but
which the Supreme Court has never avowedly taken. Funda28 Supra, note 2.
29 Supra, note 24.

30 Long v. Rockwood, 277 U. S. 142 (1928).
31 Of course a corporate franchise tax may be sustained in some circumstances, even though it is not properly an income tax. Anderson v. 42

Broadway Co., 239 U. S. 69 (1915). But -the New York Court of Appeals
has held that this tax is in essence an income tax. People v. Knapp, 230
N. Y. 48, 129 N. E. 202 (1920). See, however, People v. State Tax Cormmission, 232 N. Y. 42, 133 N. E. 122 (1921).
32
Supra, note 24.
33 People v. Law, 237 N. Y. 142, 142 N. E. 446 (1923) holds that interest from United States bonds must be included in corporate income which
is the basis of the New York tax. This seems directly contra to the holding
of the Macallen case. See also People v. Knight, 174 N. Y. 475, 67 N. E.
65 (1903).
34 Supra, note 21.
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mentally, the court reaches its decision because it feels that this
sort of tax creates such an indirect and slight burden upon copyrights that it can not properly be considered to be an unconstitutional burden upon the Federal government. This all seems
sound and sensible; but how was the court to dispose of the
Macallen case?
There was nothing simpler-in more than one sense of that
word. We are calmly informed that the Macallen case did not
overrule Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. and did not in any way affect
the principle of that case and its predecessors,3 5 that a nondiscriminatory franchise tax may be levied even though it is
measured in whole or in part by corporate assets which can not
be directly taxed, under principles already stated. The reason
for the decision in the Macallen case was, we are told, that the
Massachusetts legislature was so wicked as to have and avow an
intent to do what it might legally have done if it had only not
said so!
It is not pleasant to see the court driven to such puerile reasoning. On the other hand, the actual result is worthy of all
commendation. The court should never have stepped aside from
the sensible principle in this whole matter; namely, that encroachments by the state taxing power upon the nation or by
the national taxing power upon the states should both be permitted so long as there is no discrimination and so long as the
burden is not unreasonable. To put it another way, taxation
is a practical matter and should be decided from a practical and
not a theoretical standpoint. Outside of the Northwestern and
Macallen cases the court had usually reached results not dissimilar to the general rule here suggested; though it must be confessed that the court either did not realize that it was applying
such a test or was not frank enough to say so. In the cases last
mentioned the court deviated rather seriously from this path,
and getting back to it is neither very easy nor dignified, as the
court must know by this time to its cost. Nevertheless it is to
be hoped that it perseveres, and that the Educational Film Corporation case 36 marks a definite return to a practical rather than
a theoretical consideration of the legality of state and Federal
taxes in this field. If so, -the rather ill-starred decision of Macalen Co. v. Massachusetts, will have to be overruled or at least
largely devitalized; but this is very far from a calamity.
ROBERT C. BROWN.
Indiana University School of Law.
35 See note 20, supra.

36 Supra, note 2.

